

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MADRID 06728 121341Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 INR-07 L-03
ACDA-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06
TRSE-00 H-01 NSC-05 /066 W
-----059168 122010Z /75

R 100952Z SEP 77
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1671
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 6728

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: NATO, PORG, SP
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL ON SPAIN AND NATO

1. AT LUNCH SEPT 9 WITH THE CHARGE, DURING WHICH OTHER
SUBJECTS WERE COVERED, (SEPTELS) FOREIGN MINISTER OREJA'S
CHIEF OF CABINET (JAVIER RUPEREZ) SAID HE BELIEVED THE
GOS WAS WELL PREPARED WITH ARGUMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MADRID 06728 121341Z

IT WAS IN SPAIN'S INTEREST TO JOIN NATO. HE LATER
DISCUSSED THEM IN TERMS ESSENTIALLY THAT (1) NEUTRALITY
WAS NOT A REAL OPTION, SINCE IT WOULD HAVE TO BE EITHER
A HEAVILY ARMED NEUTRALITY, REQUIRING AN OUTLAY OF
RESOURCES BEYOND THE COUNTRY'S CAPACITY, OR AN UNARMED
ONE, WHICH WOULD LEAVE SPAIN AT THE MERCY OF ITS NEIGHBORS;
AND (2) IT WOULD BE MORE "NORMAL" AND INTERNALLY POLITICALLY

VIALE FOR SPAIN TO MAINTAIN ITS WESTERN DEFENSE LINKS AS A NATO MEMBER THAN TO CONTINUE THE BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE US IN ITS PRESENT FORM. FURTHERMORE, NATO MEMBERSHIP WOULD PROVIDE A COMMITMENT TO DEFEND SPAIN FAR MORE EXPLICIT AND COMPELLING THAN ANYTHING IN THE US-SPAIN TREATY, TOGETHER WITH GREATER NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE THAN A BILATERAL DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH ONE GREAT POWER OR AN EXPERIMENT WITH NEUTRALITY.

2. WHAT WAS A CAUSE OF CONCERN, RUPEREZ CONTINUED, WAS THE ARGUMENT THAT SPAIN'S ENTRY INTO NATO WOULD RESULT IN SOVIET PRESSURE ON YUGOSLAVIA THAT WOULD EITHER FORCE IT INTO THE WARSAW PACT OR AT LEAST SEVERELY CURTAIL ITS INDEPENDENCE. THIS ARGUMENT, RUPEREZ NOTED, WAS BEING PRESSED WITH SOME VIGOR BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR BOGOLOMOV AND OTHERS, AND THE YUGOSLAVS SEEMED HONESTLY CONCERNED. HE HIMSELF WAS AT SOME LOSS TO UNDERSTAND JUST WHY THE SOVIETS ET AL WERE SO EXERCIZED ON THE POINT: AFTER ALL, SPAIN IS ALREADY AN INTEGRAL PART OF WESTERN DEFENSE. RUPEREZ ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR JUST HOW THE SOVIETS WOULD OR COULD APPLY SUCH PRESSURE, THAT THE FUTURE OF YUGOSLAVIA WAS NOT FOR SPAIN ALONE TO WORRY ABOUT, AND THAT YUGOSLAVIA SHOULD IN LOGIC BE LEFT TO MAKE UP ITS OWN MIND ON SUCH MATTERS JUST AS SPAIN SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF. HE STATED EXPLICITLY THAT HE WAS LOOKING FOR MORE MATERIAL WITH WHICH TO REBUT THE ARGUMENT REGARDING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MADRID 06728 121341Z

YUGOSLAVIA, AND WE AGREED THAT WE WOULD TALK FURTHER ABOUT THE TOPIC IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

3. RUPEREZ DID NOT BELIEVE SPAIN WOULD OR SHOULD BE MAKING A FINAL DECISION ON NATO ENTRY ANYTIME SOON, IT WOULD NOT BE TACTICALLY WISE TO FORCE A DECISION NOW. THE GOS MIGHT BE ABLE TO WIN IN THE CORTES ON IT, BUT ITS VICTORY WOULD BE NARROW AND POSITIONS WOULD BE HARDENED. GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DECISION FOR THE COUNTRY, A SIMPLE PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY IN FAVOR OF NATO MEMBERSHIP WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH: A CONSENSUS WAS NEEDED, A VOTE IN WHICH ALL BUT A DISCOUNTABLE HANDFUL WERE IN FAVOR.

4. THIS IN EFFECT MEANT THE PSOE HAD TO BE BROUGHT AROUND. RUPEREZ NOTED THAT IT COULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE FOR THE US TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE TO SEEKING TO PERSUADE THE PSOE, WHICH HE SAID WAS TOUCHY ABOUT THE US IN THIS CONNECTION. NOR SHOULD THE US ADOPT TOO HIGH A PROFILE OTHERWISE ON SPANISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. HELP IN PERSUADING THE PSOE WAS RATHER A JOB FOR THE OTHER MEMBERS OF NATO AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST PARTIES OF EUROPE, WITH THE FRG -- AND WILLY BRANDT IN PARTICULAR -- IN ESPECIALLY GOOD POSITION TO

BE EFFECTIVE. (RUPEREZ IN FACT INDICATED A BELIEF THAT GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL SPD FINANCING STILL ENJOYED BY THE PSOE, BRANDT COULD BE QUITE PERSUASIVE.)

5. IN ANY SUCH EFFORT, HE SAID, ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE MORE EFFECTIVE DEFENSE AND GREATER REAL INDEPENDENCE OF SPAIN WERE LIKELY TO BE THE MOST TELLING. (RUPEREZ ALSO NOTED HE WAS IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH PSOE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARY LUIS YANEZ, WHOSE BROTHER IS A CAREER DIPLOMAT NOW STATIONED IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.) ASKED WHETHER ANY NATO MEMBERS HAD ALREADY BEGUN EFFORTS WITH THE PSOE, RUPEREZ SAID ONLY THAT PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER MARIO SOARES HAD PRESSED PSOE SECGEN FELIPE GONZALEZ HARD DURING THEIR MEETING IN LISBON, BUT IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MADRID 06728 121341Z

VISIT'S END GONZALEZ HAD STUCK TO THE OPPOSITION TO NATO MEMBERSHIP OF HIS PARTY'S PROGRAM.

6. PSOE THINKING ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, NOW OF THE MOST SIMPLISTIC SORT, WOULD PRESUMABLY EVOLVE OVER TIME INTO SOMETHING MORE SOPHISTICATED, RUPEREZ SAID, AND HE DOUBTED THE PSOE REALLY WOULD WANT TO LEAD SPAIN TO THE POSITION OF EITHER HELPLESSNESS OR AN ARMED CAMP THAT AN ATTEMPT AT NEUTRALITY COULD PRODUCE. WHEN FACED WITH THIS THOUGHT, AND THE OTHER ALTERNATIVES, IT OUGHT EVENTUALLY TO BECOME MORE POSITIVE ON NATO. BUT UNFORTUNATELY IN THE MEANTIME PARTY LEADERS WERE PAINTING THEMSELVES INTO A CORNER BY REPEATEDLY DECLARING PUBLICLY THEIR OPPOSITION TO NATO MEMBERSHIP.

7. REGARDING THE POSSIBLE PROCESS OF EVENTUAL SPANISH ENTRY INTO NATO, RUPEREZ NOTED THE FAVORITE GOS POINT THAT FORMALLY NATO MEMBERSHIP COMES ABOUT BY INVITATION. WE OBSERVED THAT THE SPANISH POSITION WOULD HAVE TO BE CLEAR BEFORE ANY INVITATION COULD BE EXPECTED, BUT THAT THE PROCEDURE ONCE THE TIME CAME SHOULD NOT CAUSE MAJOR DIFFICULTY. NATO COUNTRIES WERE ALREADY INDICATING IN A VARIETY OF WAYS THEIR NEWLY POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SPAIN OF TODAY. RUPEREZ TENTATIVELY INDICATED THAT NEVERTHELESS SOME SORT OF POSITIVE SIGNAL FROM NATO IN THE MEANTIME, PERHAPS AS SOON AS THIS FALL'S NATO MINISTERIAL, MIGHT BE WELCOME AND MIGHT BE USEFUL IN TERMS OF THE INTERNAL SPANISH DEBATE, BUT HE SAID HE WAS NOT SURE AND WOULD LIKE TO THINK ABOUT IT MORE. EATON

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEMBERSHIP, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, REGIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 10-Sep-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977MADRID06728
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770330-0285
Format: TEL
From: MADRID
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770978/aaaacnpa.tel
Line Count: 165
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: c7f10d49-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20-Dec-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1319364
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL ON SPAIN AND NATO
TAGS: PORG, SP, US, NATO, (RUPEREZ, JAVIER)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/c7f10d49-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009